DePaul Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law
Volume 2
Issue 2 Spring 1992

Article 6

Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 283 Cal. Rptr.
644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
Karen R. Brown

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip

Recommended Citation
Karen R. Brown, Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 283 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991),
2 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 52 (1992)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol2/iss2/6

This Case Summaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital
Commons@DePaul. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property
Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact
digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Brown: Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 283 Cal. Rptr. 64
2. Id. at 481.
3. Id. at 476.
4. The sculptural version was made of polychromed wood,
which consists of wood sculpture painted different colors with

oil paints.
5. 751F. Supp. at 476.
6. Id. at 477.
7. Id. at 477.
8. Id.
9. The court relied on the Second Circuit decision in Falk
v. T.P. Howell & Co., 37 F.Supp. 202 (S.D.NY 1888).
10. 751 F.Supp. at 477. The court relied on the decision in
Falk as well as the Second Circuit decision in King Features
Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924), for this proposition.

11. 751 F. Supp. at 477.
12. Quoting the Second Circuit opinion in Ideal 'Thy Co. v.
Fab-Lu Ltd., the court asserted that the appropriate test of
substantial similarity is "whether an average lay observer

would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated
from the copyrighted work."' Id. at 478, citing Ideal Toy Co. v.
Fab-Lu Ltd., 360F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).

13. 751 F.Supp. at 478.
14. Id. at 479.
15. Id. at 479-480.
16. Id. at 480, citing Stewart v. Abend, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1769
(1990).
17. The Ninth Circuit in Stewart concluded that re-release
of the film version of the original copyrighted story from which
it was based adversely affected the ability to market new versions of the story. 110 S.Ct. at 1769.
18. 751 F. Supp. at 480.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 481, quoting Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
22. 751 F. Supp. at 480.
23. Id.

24. Id. at 478, citingKingFeatures Syndicate, 299 F. at 536.
25. Id. at 478, citingKingFeatures Syndicate, 299 F. at 535.

Weller v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,
283 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Cal.Ct. App. 1991).

Introduction
The plaintiff, an antique silver dealer, filed a defa-

mation action against the defendants, a television
broadcasting company, a local station, and a reporter, for a broadcast concerning the origin and
value of an antique silver candelabra. A Marin
County Superior Court jury found the broadcast
defamatory and awarded the plaintiff $2.3 million
in damages. In affirming the superior court's holding, the California Court of Appeals held that the
broadcast could be understood as implying defamatory facts, and such facts were provable falsities.

Facts
In 1982, the plaintiff acquired two antique silver
candelabra from a wealthy Texas family. After repairing the candelabra, the plaintiff sold them to
the deYoung Museum in 1983 for $65,000. The
museum was apprised of the repairs to the candelabra. About a year later, one of the defendants, the
local television station, received a telephone call
from a confidential source suggesting the candelabra purchased by the museum was overpriced and
did not originate from the Texas family, but rather
from a well-known San Francisco sculptress'home.
About this same time, Jerry Durham was convicted
of insurance fraud involving silver and was suspected of stealing the candelabra in question from
the sculptress' home.
The television station proceeded to air a series of
short features on its regular nightly news program
on the subject ofthe candelabra. The first broadcast
was entitled, "Antique Fraud." The broadcast concerning the deYoung candelabra was entitled, 'Museum Fraud?" The plaintiff contended that the
broadcasts implied the following defamatory facts:
(1) the plaintiff sold to the museum a stolen candelabra at an inflated price; (2) he misrepresented the
origin, condition, and maker of the candelabra; (3)
he was an associate of the convicted Jerry Durham;
(4) he inadequately repaired the candelabra and did
not inform the museum; and, (5) he generally defrauded the museum.
Ajury trial found the defendants guilty of defamation and awarded the plaintiff general damages
totaling $2.3 million. The jury determined that an
average viewer would understand the broadcasts to
make one or more defamatory statements and
these implied statements were false. Moreover, the
jury found that the defendant/reporter made one or
more of the statements with knowledge that the
statements were false or with reckless disregard for
the truth.

Legal Analysis
The issue faced by the California Court of Appeals
was whether specific statements could be excluded
from evidence because they constituted an opinion
and were therefore constitutionally protected. In
sustaining the trial court's admission of the statements, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court recently held there is no separate
constitutional privilege protecting opinions.' In
other words, there is no "wholesale defamation
exemption" for a statement labeled an opinion. 2 In

fact, the Supreme Court reasoned that an opinion
often implies an assertion of an objective fact,
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thereby subjecting the statement to a defamation
analysis. Statements that are false are not protected.3 Nonetheless, courts are still admonished to
protect statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts, and as such are those
statements classified as satirical, hyperbolic,
imaginative, or rhetorical. 4 Therefore, the California court found that opinions, such as the broadcast
statements in question, were not absolutely privileged.
Once the court determined that the statements
may not be protected, the defendants contended the
broadcast statements should still be excluded from
jury consideration because no reasonable juror
could conclude these statements implied defamatory facts. Under constitutional analysis, a statement is defamatory if it expressly or impliedly
asserts a fact that is susceptible to being proved
false, and the language and tenor of the statement
can reasonably be interpreted as asserting actual
facts. 5 Additionally, if statements are susceptible to
both an innocent and libelous meaning, it is up to
the jury to decide how the fact should be understood, even if the defendant has made qualifying
6
statements regarding the accuracy of the fact.
The court found that the broadcasts could be understood as implying defamatory statements. The

court concluded the statements were implicitly defamatory because the defendants insisted on linking the plaintiff with the convicted felon, Jerry
Durham, while consistently alluding to the candelabra as being stolen property sold at an inflated
price. Moreover, the broadcasts could be defamatory because the defendant/reporter continually asserted that her efforts to obtain information from
the plaintiff and the museum were being "stonewalled," thereby alluding that the plaintiff and
museum had something to hide. Therefore, the
court held there was no error in submitting these
statements to a jury for determination.
Next, the court needed to determine whether the
"context and tenor" of the statements negated the
impression that the defamatory statements were
assertions of actual fact. "Ifa defendant juxtaposes
[a] series of facts so as to imply a defamatory
connection between them, or [otherwise] creates a
defamatory implication... he may be held responsible for the defamatory implication.., even if the
particular facts are correct."" In other words, it is
the implication of the statements, not the statements themselves, which must be examined to determine whether the statements are entitled to
constitutional protection. 8 Finally, couching a
statement in interrogatory language does not entitle it to constitutional protection. 9
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The defendants contended that the speculative format of the features, coupled with cautionary language, negated any impression that the reports
implied actual facts. In rejecting this position, the
court determined that unlike hyperbole or satire,
defamatory statements made in the context of a
generally accepted notion that a news broadcast is
objective and neutral is almost certain to give rise
to a viewer believing the statements to be actual
fact. The court then rejected the notion that placing
the defamatory fact in cautionary language, or putting it in the form of a question, necessarily defused
the impression that the statement is an actual fact.
Last, the court needed to determine whether some
of the implied defamatory facts were false. An inquiry into whether a defamatory statement is false
requires the plaintiff to prove that the statement
was substantially false; not whether the defendants knew or could have known at the time the
statement was made that it was false.10 In finding
that the alleged defamatory fact, the true value of
the candelabra, was a verifiable fact, the court
rejected the defendants' contention that finding
such a valuation for the candelabra was an inexact
science because the experts would reach varying
conclusions as to the candelabra's value. The court
reasoned the only concern was whether the fact
could be objectively verified. Therefore, a range of
reasonable valuation of the candelabra, which covered the plaintiffs sale price, was found by the
court to be an objective verification. Additionally,
the court found that the origin of the candelabra
asserted by the defendants was a fact that was
either true or false and could be proved in court by
the plaintiff.

Conclusion
In finding that the alleged defamatory statements
were correctly submitted to the jury for consideration, the California Court ofAppeals cautioned that
had the defendants' arguments prevailed, "similar
false broadcasts would be protected without regard
to the degree of fault involved in their publication
and without regard to [a] plaintiffs status as a
private individual."" However, as a final note, this
court emphasized that it is still unclear what impact the Milkovich decision will have on state defamation laws in light of prior defamation laws which
distinguish between opinion and fact. 9

Karen R. Brown
1. Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 283
Cal. Rptr. 644,649 (Ca. Ct. App. 1991), citingMilkovichv. Lorain
Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990).
2. 110 S.Ct. at 2705.
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